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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the monetary transmission mechanism in eight EU member 
states. It provides useful empirical evidence for assessing the impact of a common 
monetary policy in the early stages of EMU, and enables us to form a view on how the 
regime change represented by EMU is likely to be translated into changes in policy 
multipliers in the various EU countries.   The empirical analysis applies techniques 
recently developed by Wickens and Motto (2001) for identifying shocks by estimating 
a VECM for the endogenous variables, and a stationary VAR in first differences for 
the exogenous variables.  Our findings suggest that there are significant differences 
between EU countries in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.   
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a wide consensus in the macroeconomics literature that monetary policy can 
significantly influence the real economy. For instance, Taylor (1995)  and Maclennan 
et al (1999) report that monetary policy actions cause movement in real output lasting 
for over two years. However, there is less agreement on the nature of the transmission 
mechanism, which could vary across countries. Gerlach and Smets (1995) found that, 
while the effects of monetary policy shocks were not too different across countries, 
they were larger in Germany compared to France and Italy. Dornbusch et al (1998) 
estimated that in Italy the effects of changes in interest rates on output were twice as 
large as in the two leading economies, Germany and France, and about three times as 
large as in Spain.  Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998) concluded that it took twice as long 
for monetary policy shocks to affect real output in Germany and the Netherlands 
compared to France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.      
 
 
This paper aims to shed further light on the monetary transmission mechanism in 
various EU member states by investigating the possibly asymmetric effects of 
unanticipated monetary shocks. We employ techniques recently developed by 
Wickens and Motto (2001) for identifying shocks. Their approach is based on 
adopting for the endogenous variables a VECM specification, which incorporates 
long-run restrictions derived from economic theory, and estimating a VAR model in 
first differences for the exogenous variables. Impulse responses to the structural 
shocks can then be estimated without requiring any arbitrary restrictions other than 
those necessary for identifying the shocks to the exogenous variables. Such impulse 
responses lend themselves to economic interpretation and are suitable for policy 
analysis, in contrast to alternative methods used in the earlier empirical literature. 
 
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly the 
previous literature on the channels through which monetary policy can affect the real 
economy. Section 3 discusses the identification of monetary shocks and outlines the 
econometric approach taken in the present study. Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks and highlights the policy 
implications of our findings. 
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 2. Differences in the monetary transmission mechanism 
 
Various authors have pointed out that the transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy can vary substantially, owing, e.g., to differences in financial structures (see 
MPC, 1999). It is well known that central bank preferences differ across European 
countries (see Clarida et al, 1999). One reason might be that central banks face 
different economic environments. In countries where loans and bonds are imperfect 
substitutes, a rise in interest rates not only reduces the supply of loans, but also 
increases the cost of external finance, as firms have to pay a higher premium on bonds 
(see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Therefore the effects on the real economy of a 
given degree of monetary tightening are greater.  
 
Changes in interest rates can also have asymmetric income effects, if the net asset 
positions of consumers differ. In high-debt economies more consumers will become 
liquidity constrained as a result of a tighter monetary stance, which will depress 
consumption to a greater extent.  Jappelli and Pagano (1994) studied how credit 
access conditions vary using a sample of 30 countries covering the period 1981-1987.  
The maximum loan-to-value ratio applied to individuals seeking a loan to buy a house 
was used as an indicator of credit access.  Their study found that the minimum down-
payment required to buy a dwelling was especially high in Italy, Portugal, and Austria 
compared to France, Germany and the UK.  Trautwein (2000) and Clements et al 
(2001) looked at the role of credit channel in explaining cross countries differences in 
the strength of the monetary transmission mechanism. Using a sample of 12 European 
countries Clements et al (2001) found that monetary policy can affect output through 
its effects on credit.  Barran et al (1997) showed how an access indicator (households' 
access to credit) is correlated with the availability of consumer credit relative to GDP. 
The argument is that different bank practices and regulations across countries lead to 
some differences in the response of the final demand components. Kneeshaw (1995) 
examined this relationship and found that asymmetries persist.  Relative to disposable 
income, in Italy households have low debt levels. On the other hand, households in 
France, Germany and the UK are highly indebted.   Changes in interest rates can also 
affect agents’ income and wealth.  A rise in interest rates affects the net flows of 
interest payments and the value of shares and bonds.  The impact varies from one 
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country to another owing to differences in agents’ financial positions.  Cusson (1992) 
found that in France, for example, a fall in interest rates lowers households’ potential 
earnings and increases corporate sector potential earnings.   This is because the more 
financial assets households own, the less effective monetary policy will be, as a rise in 
the rate of interest tends to increase income rather than constrain spending.  In the 
UK, for example, where households hold a substantial proportion of their assets in 
shares, they will tend to save at times when interest rates are high to maximize their 
financial wealth.   As the distribution of wealth and households’ financial position 
varies across countries, so will the effect of monetary policy.    
 
The transmission mechanisms of monetary policy can also vary substantially owing to 
differences in credit indexation practices.  In countries, such as the UK, where 
mortgage credit is allocated using floating rates and loans are made at rates that may 
be revised at the discretion of the lender, a rise in interest rates will lower households’ 
aggregate spending and bank lending.  In France just 30% of the loans are at rates that 
may be revised and the rest are at re-negotiable rates; therefore, a rise in interest rates 
has a weaker effect on households’ aggregate spending.  Fiorentini and Tamborini 
(2002) studied the monetary transmission mechanism in Italy, and found strong 
evidence that the credit transmission mechanism is more important than the money 
transmission mechanism.   
 
Finally, the shape of the yield curve might differ across countries. Borrowing might 
be mainly short-term in some of them, but long-term in others. Under such 
circumstances a decision by the ECB to raise short rates, which could actually result 
in a fall in long rates, is likely to have asymmetric impacts on the national economies. 
Additional transmission mechanisms are analysed by Taylor (1995). Besides the 
standard interest rate effects on consumption and investment and the credit channel 
already mentioned, he discusses the transmission channel operating through exchange 
rate effects on net exports, and other asset price effects, such as the lower Tobin’s q 
and level of investment which are caused by the lower equity prices resulting from a 
monetary contraction. Other possible interest rate effects include indirect effects on 
consumer expenditure via income uncertainty or volatility (see Maclennan et al, 
1999).  Chiades and Gambacorta (2000) tested for an exchange rate channel in 
addition to the traditional money and credit channels of monetary policy in the 
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context of a structural VAR (SVAR), using data from 1984 to 1998, and found that, in 
the short run, monetary policy shocks are transmitted through the two former 
channels, whilst the exchange rate does not respond to interest rate shocks, giving rise 
to an exchange rate "puzzle". 
 
The existence of significant institutional differences across the EU member states is 
highlighted, inter alia, by Maclennan et al (1999), who focus on barriers to 
convergence in financial systems after EMU. They conclude that European countries 
tend to have a cluster of high or low response characteristics to interest rate changes 
(see also Ramaswamy and Sloek, 1997), which could result in tensions within EMU, 
and makes it essential to implement appropriate institutional reforms. Giovannetti and 
Marimon (1998) also showed that conflicts of interest might arise in the pursuit of a 
common monetary policy if differences in the relative efficiency of financial 
intermediaries across the EU countries persist.  
 
A study by Fatas (1998), for the period 1960 to 1996, suggests that there are 
significant asymmetric shocks, which have lasting effects on the GDP of individual 
countries relative to the EU average (see also Arrowsmith et al, 1999). However, the 
available evidence on differences in monetary policy multipliers is contradictory (see 
Dornbusch et al, 1998). The findings based on large macro-econometric models 
indicate that asymmetries might be significant, whilst the results obtained using small 
reduced-form VAR specifications are less supportive of this idea. (There is also 
evidence from the optimal currency areas literature suggesting that impulse response 
functions vary considerably across countries, even when the shocks are symmetric). 
Both approaches have been criticised for their shortcomings (for instance, the lack of 
transparence of large models, and the difficulties in achieving identification in the 
context of VARs), and neither of them addresses the issue of the stability over time of 
the estimated relationships. 
 
3. Identifying monetary shocks 
 
Despite the evidence presented in Bagliano and Favero (1998) in favour of standard 
“benchmark” VAR models, serious objections can be raised against the standard VAR 
methodology used to analyse monetary shocks. Firstly, there is the issue of 
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misspecification because of the omission of important variables. This means that the 
estimated “monetary” residuals will in fact be a mixture of monetary and other 
shocks. Secondly, the Lucas critique is even more relevant in the context of VAR 
specifications, which do not model the underlying behavioural relationships. The third 
problem is the identification of the structural parameters. It is standard practice to 
achieve it by assuming that there is simultaneous feedback only from monetary to 
macro variables (and not vice versa), which is consistent with a number of theoretical 
models, and by imposing restrictions on the monetary block which reflect institutional 
features. To compute the impulse response functions the disturbances from the 
moving average (reduced form) representation of the model are then orthogonalised 
using the Choleski decomposition. Forecast error variance decomposition is also 
routinely carried out. There are two obvious problems with this approach (see Pesaran 
and Smith, 1998). Firstly, the impulse responses are obtained using orthogonalised 
errors, not the structural or even reduced form errors. Secondly, this procedure 
involves choosing a particular ordering of variables. Consequently, different estimates 
of the impulse responses will be obtained depending on what ordering is adopted. In 
fact, the assumptions needed in this context in order to identify the responses are 
equivalent to traditional identification assumptions. A possible alternative is to 
impose a priori restrictions on the covariance matrix of the structural errors and the 
contemporaneous and/or long-run impulse response functions themselves, as in the 
Structural VAR approach. However, this method typically involves assuming that the 
structural errors are uncorrelated, which is not plausible in many cases, and requires a 
high number of restrictions, which makes its implementation possible only in the case 
of very small systems.  
 
Recent methodological developments aim at addressing the issues highlighted above. 
In particular, Garratt, Lee, Pesaran and Shin (2000) have attempted to tackle the 
identification problem, namely the fact that in the presence of multiple cointegrating 
vectors the estimated vectors cannot be interpreted as identifiable long-run relations 
unless additional restrictions are imposed. Their approach is to restrict the 
cointegrating space and then use a constrained maximum likelihood estimator instead 
of the standard Johansen estimator. However, this leaves the problem of identifying 
the shocks unsolved. Pesaran and Shin (1998) have recently advocated generalized 
impulse response analysis for unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) and 
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cointegrated VAR models. This has two major advantages, namely: (i) it does not 
require orthogonalisation of the shocks; (ii) it is invariant to the ordering of the 
variables in the VAR. The derived impulse responses are unique, and also take into 
account the historical patterns of correlations observed amongst the different shocks. 
They coincide with the orthogonalised responses only in the special case when the 
variance/covariance matrix is diagonal – usually, they are substantially different. 
 
However, as pointed out by Wickens and Motto (2001), it is not possible to give an 
economic interpretation to the “persistence profiles” (i.e. the response of the error 
correction terms to shocks to the disturbances of the cointegrating VAR - CVAR) 
estimated in this way. This would require imposing restrictions on the disturbances of 
the CVAR, so as to be able to compute impulse responses to the structural shocks. 
They suggest, therefore, an alternative methodology. Specifically, this involves 
adopting for the endogenous variables a VECM specification, which incorporates 
long-run restrictions derived from economic theory, and estimating a VAR model in 
first differences for the exogenous variables. The full system then includes both sets 
of equations, and can be used to compute impulse responses to the structural shocks, 
without requiring any arbitrary restrictions other than those necessary for identifying 
the shocks to the exogenous variables. The estimated impulse responses then have an 
economic interpretation and are suitable for policy analysis.  
 
The basic idea is to assume that it is possible to decide which variables are 
endogenous and which are exogenous. The assumption is that the endogenous 
variables are determines by a structural simultaneous equation model (SEM): 
 
B(L)γ t + C(L) χ t + Rdt = et                                                                                   (1) 
 
where γ t is a ρ ×1 vector of endogenous variables, χ t is a q ×  1 vector of 
exogenous variables, both being I(1), and dt represents a vector of deterministic 
variables. 
 
If st is an r ×  1 vector of stationary endogenous variables, equation (1) becomes 
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F(L)st + B(L)γ t + C(L) χ t = et                                                                               (2) 
 
Assuming that the equations for the stationary variables takes the form 
 
ttsttt zKMLHyLGsLJ t εβχ =′++∆+∆+∆ −− 11)()()(                                         (3) 
 
and assuming that the exogenous variables are generated by 
 
tttt SdyLExLD ε+=∆+∆ −1)()(                                                                              (4) 
 
allows (2) to be written as 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] tttt ezLCLBLFzIFzCBF +∆+′=∆ −− * 1* 1* )(~)(~)(~)1()0()0()0( β                             (5) 
 
Where the roots of [ ] 0)1)(( =+− MLLLj  lie outside the unit circle. 
 
The complete system is given by combining (4) and (5), and can be written as the 
CVAR 
 
**
1
**
1
*** )( tttt zLAzz νβα +∆+−=∆ −−′                                                                          (6) 
 
Equation (6) is not a standard cointegrated VAR, as it contains equations for the 
stationary as well as the non-stationary variables. 
 
The sub-system of equations for the combined stationary and non-stationary 
endogenous variables can then be written as 
 
[ ] ** 1**1** 11**1** )(~)(~)0()0()0()0( ttttt ezLCLBBwBxCBy +∆+−∆−=∆ −−−−−             (7) 
 
Both equation (7) and the equations for the exogenous variables can then be estimated 
by OLS, and impulse response functions can be calculated from equation (6). 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
The selected countries are Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, 
UK, and Italy, for which consistent data series are available The model is estimated 
using quarterly data for the period 1981q1 to 1998 for Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
Spain, and Italy. For the UK and France, the estimation period extends to 2002q2.  All 
variables are in logarithms, except the interest rates, which are in levels. The data are 
taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the OECD’s quarterly 
accounts. 
 
ADF tests indicate that the interest rates are stationary or I (0) variables, whilst the 
other series variables are non-stationary or I (1).  The Johansen and Juselius (1989) 
tests do not reject the null of a single cointegrating vector in each case among the I (1) 
variables. 
 
In order to identify the impulse response functions, we estimate a VAR model using 
four different specifications as explained below. The main exogenous monetary 
policy instrument is assumed to be the money market rate. The impulse response 
functions are reported for a horizon of 15 quarters.  
 
The responses to a monetary shock 
 In the first VAR specification the variables are included in the following order: GDP 
at 1995 constant prices, the consumer price index, the exchange rate, and the money 
market interest rate. First we trace the effect of a one standard deviation shock to 
(increase in) the call money market rate (i.e. short-term interest rate). The impulse 
response functions for this model (see Chart 1) show that such a shock to the system 
results in a fall in output in all countries under study. However, the decline in output 
varies across countries. In the case of Austria, Denmark, France, and Spain output 
falls soon after the occurrence of the shock, which appears to have a strong effect. 
The immediate effect of the shock is apparent in quarter one and two. Furthermore, it 
is relatively big in some of these countries, namely France and Spain.  By contrast, 
output is affected much later in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK, and the 
effects of the shock are weak, particularly in the UK, where they appear to die out 
quickly. With the exception of the UK, the maximum effects on output are reached 
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between eight and fourteen quarters.  One possible reason for the time lag in the UK 
response is the fact that most households’ debts are indexed with short-term interest 
rates.  The impact of monetary policy on output is also dependent on the credibility of 
the central bank. One could argue that the impact on output is much higher in 
countries where monetary policy is less credible (Clements et al, 2001). These results 
are in contrast to those of Barran et al (1997), who found that the maximum effects 
occur between four and ten quarters in most countries under study. Their study also 
finds the biggest impact in Germany, where output begins to fall immediately after the 
interest rate shock. Unlike Barran et al (1997), we find that France is the country most 
affected.  
 
To shed light on how individual components of output are affected by monetary 
shocks, a second VAR model that includes the main components of final demand (i.e., 
consumption, private investment and residential investment) was also estimated. One 
would expect a larger effect on private investment expenditure than on household 
consumption since the corporate sector is generally a net borrower (see Barran et al, 
1997).  Overall, the results of the impulse response analysis (see Chart 2) support this 
argument, suggesting that a monetary policy shock will contract investment 
expenditure more than household consumption, and are consistent with the fact that 
aggregate private consumption constitutes only 20% of aggregate consumption.   The 
decline of investment expenditure and household consumption varies across countries. 
In Spain and Germany investment falls much more sharply than in France, UK, and 
Denmark.  High indebtedness levels of the corporate sector may explain this strong 
sensitivity to interest rates. The influence of monetary policy on firms depends on 
their liabilities. High indebtedness can cause high negative cash-flow effects and 
intensify credit constraints. Indebtedness is rather high in Germany – accordingly, 
German firms should suffer comparatively more than those in the UK, France and 
Denmark.  Also, the decline in household consumption is greater in Spain, Italy, and 
Denmark than in the UK, Germany, and France. Except for Spain and the UK, the 
adjustment pattern is very similar, with the trough occurring after 12 quarters.  In the 
UK, the relatively weak response of households’ consumption to a monetary shock 
may reflect the fact that households hold a substantial proportion of their assets in 
bonds and shares, and hence have less money available to spend on consumer goods 
and services.  
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 The channels through which monetary policy is affecting economic activity were 
investigated next using a third specification, which included different possible 
transmission variables, namely, exchange rates, long-term interest rates (government 
bond yield) and credit to the private domestic sector. The third model also includes all 
the variables of the first one.  For an exchange rate channel to exist, two conditions 
have to be fulfilled. First, an interest rate shock should lead to a currency appreciation 
(decrease in the exchange rate). Second, the appreciation should result in a fall in both 
output and prices.  Chart 3 shows the response to an interest rate shock.    The results 
show that in most countries this leads to a currency appreciation (decrease in the 
exchange rate).   Moreover, a positive exchange rate shock (depreciation) leads to a 
fall in output in all countries except France and the Netherlands.  It also results in 
higher prices, except in Denmark, Germany, France, and the UK.  Exchange rate 
fluctuations affect spending in two ways: firstly, through a price effect on imported 
goods, with a direct impact on consumer prices; secondly, through their impact on 
trade.  We find that an exchange rate channel is in operation only in Denmark, 
Germany and the UK, where the two conditions are fulfilled, and are in contrast to 
those of Barran et al (1997), who reported that there is no exchange rate channel in all 
countries under study apart from Spain. With the exception of France, our findings 
confirm the view that the exchange rate channel operates mainly in largely open 
economies.    
 
The same model was also used to assess the effects of shocks to the long-term interest 
rate (government bond yield) on economic activity.  A one standard deviation shock 
(increase) is considered. This is found to result in a significant fall in output in various 
countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Spain and Denmark, the 
UK being the single exception.  These results are consistent with the fact that credit is 
indexed using short-term interest rates in the UK, where 73% of all credit is allocated 
at short-term rates (Borio, 1995), and long-term interest rates in most of the other EU 
countries.   It is interesting to note that in countries where monetary policy was more 
closely aligned to German monetary policy, such as Austria and the Netherlands, the 
degree of persistence and the size of the effects of long-term interest rate shock are 
very similar to the German ones. By contrast, in Barran et al (1997) a shock to the 
long-term interest rate makes output decline in all countries apart from the UK and 
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Italy; this is rather implausible, as one would expect that in Italy, where a sizeable 
amount of credit is indexed using the long-term interest rate (in Italy, 49% of all credit 
is allocated at long term or adjustable rate see Borio, 1995), a shock of this type will 
have a negative impact on the economy.  
 
The fourth model assesses the responses of credit and money supply to a change in   
the call money market rate. Credit rapidly decreases after a monetary shock in all 
countries. Barran et al (1997) found instead that in Germany, the UK and Spain credit 
continues to rise for several quarters. One would expect an interest rate shock to affect 
credit much more than money. The impulse response functions show that indeed the 
former falls much more sharply than money does in response to such a shock in all 
countries under study.  One plausible explanation for this result might be that the 
direct effects of the monetary policy shock are amplified by changes in the external 
financial premium. This might account for the strength of monetary policy effects on 
total credit. Monetary policy affects the external finance premium by shifting the 
supply of credit, particularly loans by commercial banks.  Decreasing the supply of 
credit will increase it and reduce real economic activity.  The importance of credit for 
monetary transmission reflects the fact that lenders, in the case of short-term loans, 
can pass on interest rate changes or withdraw the loans to reduce lending. This 
increases the speed of monetary transmission.  Hence monetary policy can affect the 
real economy without much variation in the open market interest rate. Moreover, it 
can influence investment decisions, and have distributional effects for lenders and 
borrowers.       
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have investigated whether there are differences between eight EU 
member states in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  Specifically, we 
have examined the effects of monetary shocks on real economic activity, exchange 
rates, credit to private domestic sector and monetary aggregates.  Our empirical 
findings suggest that indeed there are asymmetric effects of such shocks on the 
economies of the eight countries under study, and that differences in the monetary 
transmission mechanism have not disappeared with the creation of EMU.  A common 
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monetary shock will affect member countries in a very different way, with the timing 
and depth of responses varying considerably from country to another. 
 
This implies that the costs of a common monetary policy (see von Hagen, 1997, for a 
detailed description of the ECB’s policy framework) are not evenly distributed 
between EU countries. For example, the effects of a monetary shock on real output in 
France and Spain are sizeable.   By contrast, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
UK are affected with a significant time lag. This suggests that a common monetary 
policy could worsen the cyclical positions of countries such as France and Spain. On 
the other hand, the sensitivity of the exchange rate to a monetary shock is higher in 
smaller than in larger economies, suggesting that the latter will react relatively more 
strongly and rapidly to monetary shocks. Consequently, an appreciation of the 
effective exchange rate has a more dramatic effect on real output in smaller rather 
than in larger economies. This will have negative consequences on aggregate demand, 
and hence economic growth, in smaller economies. Moreover, some monetary 
transmission channels might be more important in some countries relative to others. 
Smaller economies appear to be more sensitive to monetary policy shocks, which 
have a stronger and more immediate effect on real output and investment. By contrast, 
larger EU economies absorb such shocks more easily and their economic activity is 
less affected.   
 
Our results suggest that the costs of joining EMU could be considerably higher than 
previously thought for some countries, and that appropriate policies might be required 
in such cases. In particular, they highlight the importance of measures to make 
financial systems more integrated, and therefore the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism more similar in the EMU countries. For instance, further harmonisation of 
capital market and banking (as well as trading) regulations might be desirable. 
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Italy  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of prices to an interest rate shock
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
1 2 3
Response of exchange rate to an interest rate shock
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to an interest rate shock
-0. 10
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
Response of output to an interest rate shock
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 -4
-3
-2
-1
0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of exchange rate to an interest rate shock
Response of prices to an interest rate shock 0. 4
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of prices to an interest rate shock
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to an interest rate shock
R0.
-0.0015
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
esponse of exchange rate to an interest rate shock
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to an interest rate shock
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0. 600
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of  prices to an interest rate rate shock
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
Response of exchange rate to an interest rate shock
0. 30
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
 
 
France 
 
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to an interest rate shock
                             
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to an interest rate shock
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of exchange rate to an interest rate shock
 
 
Netherlands 
                      
                                                                                                    
Response of prices to an interest rate shock
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0015
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to an interest rate shock
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of exchange rate to an interest rate shock
0. 3
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Spain 
          
                                
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to an interest rate shock
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to an interest rate shock
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of exchange rate to an interest rate shock
 
UK 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to an interest rate shock
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to an interest rate shock
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of exchange rate to an interest rate shock
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CHART 2 
Model 2 
 
            Denmark                                      Germany                                                       Italy 
                                                                                                                               
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of private investment to an interest rate shock
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of consumption to an interest rate shock
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of residential investment to an interest rate shock
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of private investment to an interest rate shock
-0.0020
-0.0015
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of consumption to an interest rate shock
-0.0020
-0.0015
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of residential investment to an interest rate shock
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of private investment to an interest rate shock
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of consumption to an interest rate shock
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of residential investment to an interest rate shock
 
                
 
                 France                              Spain                             UK 
                                                                                                
-0.0016
-0.0012
-0.0008
-0.0004
0.0000
0.0004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of private investment to an interest rate shock
-0.0008
-0.0006
-0.0004
-0.0002
0.0000
0.0002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of consumption to an interest rate shock
-0.0006
-0.0004
-0.0002
0.0000
0.0002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of residential investment to an interest rate shock
-0.025
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of private investment to an interest rate shock
-0.010
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of consumption to an interest rate shock
-0.025
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of residential investment to an interest rate shock
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of residential investment to an interest rate shock
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of private investment to an interest rate shock
-0.0006
-0.0004
-0.0002
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of consumption to an interest rate shock
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CHART 3 
Model 3 
 
Austria                                                                Denmark 
                                                                
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.0015
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of credit to a shock in the exchange rate
 
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to a shock in the exchange rate
Response of credit to a shock in the exchange rate
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.002
0.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-0.004
-0.002
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                     Germany                                                              Italy 
                                                              
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of credit to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of credit to a shock in the exchange rate
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                       France                                                Netherlands                                                                                                   
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to shock in the exchange rate
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to shock in the exchange rate
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of credit to shock in the exchange rate
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of credit to a shock in the exchange rate
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                       Spain                                                                               UK                                                                                     
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of credit to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of output to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of prices to a shock in the exchange rate
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Response of credit to a shock in the exchange rate
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
CHART 4 
Model 4 
 
 
Austria 
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of credit to an interest rate shock
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of money to an interest rate shock
 
Denmark 
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of money to an interest rate shock
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of credit to an interest rate shock
 
 
France 
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of credit to an interest rate shock
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of money to an interest rate shock
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Germany 
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of credit to an interest rate shock
-0.0020
-0.0015
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of money to an interest rate shock
 
 
 
Italy 
 
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of credit to an interest rate shock
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of money to an interest rate shock
 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of credit to an interest rate shock
-0.0015
-0.0010
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of money to an interest rate shock
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